Preface
This research paper recognizes the current and future ballistic missile developments and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to the free world. Despite all political counterproliferation efforts, active missile defense is essential and vital for the US and its
European allies. The authors belief that is necessary to develop and deploy an European Theater
Missile Defense capability to deter and defend the European Homeland and European forces deployed abroad. Due to the complex issue of an effective and all regions covering ballistic missile defense architecture, these efforts can only be accomplished by international cooperation and common development of systems. We strongly believe that is possible and that the US and its European allies can successfully work together by sharing technology on a fair basis. Despite the current dependence on US early warning and space based information systems, we belief that there is also in this field room for cooperation and technology share. The European nations and their industries have proven their experience and capabilities in the space business. Our paper tries to address some ways of cooperation in developing an European Ballistic Missile Defense capability for Europe and its deployed forces.
Special thanks goes to Col Vic Budura and Col Chuck Thompson at the Air War College for their outstanding support as our advisers and to all our friends at NATO who fed as with information and good ideas.
Introduction

"The use of Theater Missiles can be traced back to the beginning of TBM (Tactical Ballistic Missile) developments by Germany during the Second World War. Initially, the German use of the V-1 and V-2 rockets posed a major challenge to allied forces attempting to protect England from air attack. The primitive radar system could track missiles in flight, but there was no intelligence sources available providing real time information of time and location of launch."
1 One of the primary impacts of the Gulf War on Western opinion was to underline the reality of a ballistic missile threat. The USA subsequently gave top priority to the development of a system against tactical ballistic missiles as part of an overall Missile Defense Program. 2 In the era of confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, NATO 3 had deliberately refrained from establishing a defense capability against ballistic missiles and relied solely on the deterrent potential of nuclear weapons. Now anti-missile defense capabilities are the subject of intensive discussions in various European Nations, NATO bodies and working groups. The notion of a "Theater Missile Defense" (TMD) which is taking shape, however, is mainly focused on the area of active defense measures, particularly ballistic missile defense. Despite all deterrence and counterproliferation means, NATO is willing to build its own capabilities in the context of an Integrated Extended Air Defense.
Against the background of the broadened task spectrum of the German Armed Forces and in view of new risks and new players, Germany for example recognizes the increased role of tactical missile defense 4 in its conceptual framework and is constantly improving its air defense inventory. Therefore the Bundeswehr Concept/Missions and Capabilities (KdB/TAF) 5 establishes a comprehensive conceptual framework for antimissile defense: "As a joint task it must at least provide limited protection of territory, facilities, and forces -also during deployments in connection with international crisis management...." 6 According to NATO' s threat assessment the ask is to counter the entire air threat posed by ballistic and aerodynamic missiles" 7 .
This research concentrates on Theater Missile Defense (TMD). First, after a description of the current and future missile threat and the problems occurring from proliferation, the Ballistic
Missile Programs of NATO/WEU (representing the European concept), and the US Missile
Defense programs will be analyzed. Following this background, the current European dependence on specific U.S. early warning and space assets will be analyzed. Lastly, this paper will address fields of equal and fair multinational cooperation as a way to reduce costs and to optimize limited resources by sharing technology and capabilities.
While missile defense is a complex issue, this paper, as previously stated, focuses primarily on Theater Missile Defense. According to US definitions, the purpose of TMD is to protect forces, allies and other countries, including areas of vital interest , from theater missile attacks.
The TMD mission includes protection of population centers, fixed civilian and military assets and mobile military units.
Due to the above mentioned limitations strategic missile defense issues and international treaty questions are not covered in this paper. 
Notes
Basic Missile Defense Concepts
The strategy for dealing with this kind of threat has three different components: preventing and reducing the threat; deterring the threat; or defending against the threat. For example, for preventing or reducing the threat, there are different Non-Proliferation Treaties such as the INF Treaty, export controls and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)
The second line of defense is deterrence. In the case of the strategic missiles threat to the United States, the strategic nuclear forces have been a bulwark of deterrence for now three decades. Now finally, if these two lines of defense do not work, the US or NATO have to be prepared to defend directly against a threat.
Due to the limited focus of this paper, we'll further on concentrate only on the defending part of this complex strategy, while well recognizing the importance of the other two elements. We will discuss and analyze now the basics of theater missile defense in NATO and the US.
European Theater Missile Defense (NATO)
Based on US experiences and already developed TMD systems, the European NATO nations views the function of an active Theater Missile Defense as a complex and interactive architecture.
Therefor a TMD architecture 11 requires a system consisting of 3 major components:
•Sensor for early warning and surveillance of ballistic missile attack/missile launch.
•Interceptor to destroy a ballistic missile in flight ( from boost phase to descent phase by offensive or defensive means).
•Battle management /C 4 I for sensor management, data processing and dissemination, cueing command & control and communications.
TBMs can be effectively engaged and destroyed in multilayered Lower and Upper Tier 12 defense; the concept can be characterizes as follows:
Lower Tier (0-35 km altitude/endo-atmospheric/terminal phase interception) defense provides the capability to defense against the air breathing threat and the short range TBM.
Against short range TBM (300-1000 km range) the Lower Layer can provide a "Point Defense"
and "Limited Area Defense" capability with defended footprints of 25 km radius today and up to 40 km radius with SAM systems foreseen over the next two decades. 13 Within the Alliance, only
German, Dutch, and deployed US PATRIOT systems have the capability to engage both the classical air threat and the shorter range type TBM threat. These assets are Lower Tier systems.
The Lower Layer SAM systems can also provide a "Third Shot" capability against long range TBM leakers not intercepted in the Upper Layer. Against these long range (>1000 km range)
TBMs the defended footprint radius would be much smaller (of the order of 10-25 km radius depending on the TBM range).
14 Upper Tier ( 35-500+ km altitude/ endo-/low exo-atmospheric/midcourse phase interception ) defense is designed primarily for defense against the long range TBM although it is possible to design some systems to have limited defense capability against the shorter range TBM. The stateof-the-art as it is known today and in the foreseeable future will support two basic types of systems:
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•those with an "endo-exo" battlespace are capable of intercepting the TBM in the upper part of the atmosphere and into space and,
•those with an "exo" only battlespace where all intercepts occur above the atmosphere.
The Upper Layer defense system provides a "Wide Area Defense" capability with defended footprints of 100-500 km radius depending on several key parameters (interceptor burn-out speed, amount of early warning provided and degree of separation of interceptor launch site and early warning sensor). 16 Right now there are no upper layer systems in NATO available or deployed by the US in Europe.
Due to limited financial resources and other priorities, NATO will focus first on the development of a lower tier capability and the integration of a missile defense concept in its current Integrated Air Defense Structure 17 . The Upper Tier defense -the most effective onecontinues to be the ultimate goal.
On the other hand the US has or will have in the near future all necessary elements to fulfill all necessary functions of both tiers of the above described system. This includes the use of space based sensors provided by the Defense Support Program (DSP) for early warning and missile tracking, and the essential BMC4I elements like JTAGS (Joint Tactical Ground System) and JTIDS (Joint Tactical Data Information Dissemination System) for dissemination of attacking missiles and cueing of ground based interceptors. For defense in the Upper Tier, the US Army Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system will give the US significant operational flexibility and almost full coverage for their forces. These elements are exclusively being developed 18 and fielded by the United States and not deployed to NATO. It can be assumed however, that in a crisis in NATO's area of responsibility, or where NATO forces are involved, the US will support NATO or selected Allies with these capabilities.
Due to the fact that Lower Tier missions right now can only be accomplished by GE and NL PATRIOT units (as NATO Command Forces) or in-theater deployed US forces, NATO's TMD capabilities are limited. PATRIOT as an interceptor for TBM engagements is able to engage and destroy incoming TBMs in the Lower Tier and to protect a limited area. Due to the system configuration, the effectiveness in TBM missions will be increased dramatically by using early warning and cueing information. This information gives the PATRIOT system more reaction time. For the European PATRIOT units (GE and NL),this information must be provided by the US via external support elements. Only the US has these elements in their inventory (EUCOM will support with JTAGS (Joint Tactical Ground System) 19 and JTIDS (Joint Tactical Data Information Dissemination System) for the European Theater and will use early warning information from DSP satellites).
The US as the major partner of NATO provides the Alliance with this support. But these forces are not NATO forces or part of the NATO command structure. The use is based on agreements between NATO and the US government. 20 As long as non-US SAM (Surface to Air Missile) forces (European) are operating under NATO command and under conditions of compatibility with these elements, the US can and will provide the required information. Under these conditions, there will be no significant operational impact.
If Germany or the Netherlands, however, have to deploy their forces in UN or WEU missions with little or no US participation/support, the effectiveness of the German and Dutch PATRIOT units in TBM missions will be limited. In these circumstances the described above external support must be negotiated case by case. This dependence on US national support, especially when dealing with space based information, can not be tolerated in the long run.
Taking this into account, Germany and France are currently negotiating combined projects to build and use their own space based early warning and reconnaissance systems by developing the HELIOS II and HORUS satellite systems 21 . These projects must also be seen in the context of the European approach to consolidate their way to a real political union (European Union) and the finding of a European security identity within NATO and WEU.
Britain on the other hand is currently considering the development of a national BMD network, including early warning satellite and shipboard and airborne interceptors 22 . According to a prefeasibility study, collaborating with Europe and the US are essential for economic and political reasons 23 .
US Missile Defense Program
According to the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, the US Ballistic Missile
Defense Program is structured to respond to existing and emerging ballistic missile threats to the United States, its forward deployed forces, allies and friends around the world. 24 The highest priority is Theater Missile Defense/TMD; the next highest priority is National Missile Defense/NMD; and the third priority is an investment in BMD advanced technologies in order to enhance future BMD capabilities for both TMD and NMD 25 .
The NMD program is concerned with the possibility of a limited ballistic missile strike against the US homeland. Planned TMD systems are Ground Based Interceptors, Ground Based Radars and Battle Management/Comand, Control, and Communications elements. 26 Due to the focus on TMD systems, NMD systems are second in priority and will be developed. There are no fielded TMD systems right now.
The TMD program on the other hand concentrates on the immediate ballistic missile threat and has the highest priority of the BMDO programs because this current threat holds the highest risks to US forces. 27 BMDO is working to develop both land and sea based TMD systems to give US forces the greatest flexibility and provide the most effective TMD.
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Similar to NATO, the US TMD area is divided into an upper and a lower tier, basically defined by the altitude at which intercept takes place, the speed of the interceptor and the speed of the incoming missile. TMD systems are built to operate best in one tier, although there may be some crossover capability. This allows the system to best match and negate specific types of missile threats. Moreover, this arrangement gives TMD forces multiple opportunities to destroy an incoming missile as it passes through the tiers.
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Different systems are assigned to each tier. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) system and the Airborne Boost-Phase
Intercept (BDI) system will operate in the upper tier while the Patriot Advanced Capabilities (PAC 3) system, the Navy Area Defense and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) cover the lower tier. Only three of these systems -PAC 3, THAAD and the Navy Lower Tier -are now in the acquisition phase.
Therefore the US has or will have in the future the whole inventory at their disposal to fulfill all major tasks/missions for an effective missile defense system. From satellites and eventually future space based laser, to deployable BM/C4I elements and various sea and land based interceptors, the US is able to cover the whole spectrum in national and theater missile defense as well. The current and future major projects are listed in Appendix F.
The Dependence on US Earl Warning Assets
Since one of the areas of focus of this paper is on the essential need of space based assets for early warning, surveillance, tracking and communication in a Missile Defense System we will concentrate now on the early warning and sensor systems available for missile defense. While the US is very well developed in this area, the European countries have concentrated more in the past on weapon systems like PATRIOT or MEADS as the future medium extended air defense system, a trinational cooperation (US/IT/GE).
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Regarding space assets NATO, uses information from US assets and they are available for all members. In the WEU context, without the deployment of US forces or the use of US space and BM/C 4 I assets, the European nations are without any missile defense early warning and tracking capability.
In a 4 Nov 94 letter to NATO, US Deputy Secretary of Defense offered to share ballistic missile early warning information from its space-based Defense Support Program (DSP) with NATO and individual alliance members. DSP can provide regional launch warning to include: launch time, launch location, azimuth, impact location, missile type, and number of missiles.
Such early warning information satisfies two main objectives:
•to make global proliferation more visible and focus attention on preventing and countering the proliferation of missile technology and WMD; and
•support passive defense measures and enhance TMD capabilities by assuring Alliance TMD forces receive space-based missile launch early warning.
Higher fidelity space-based early warning information, available from refinements of processing techniques and deployment of next-generation systems, will be available to NATO and individual Alliance members who acquire and field advanced TMD systems which will benefit from the more precise information. 31 The US European Command, with support from US Space Command, has been tasked to work with NATO and nations to develop system requirements, a concept of operations, and an implementation plan. USEUCOM will initiate discussions with NATO and individual Alliance members as necessary to develop these plans 32 .
However since the Gulf war there is a growing tendency in Europe to be independent from the USA for early warning assets and to develop an European independent missile defense capability. In the upper tier area where the US Navy will have its Aegis system and the US Army is developing its THAAD system, it is surprising that Europe up until now ever translated their requirements for missile defense in the upper tier into specifications ( they acknowledged the need for upper tier, but initially try to realize a lower tier defense) . Probably Europe (NATO) is more or less reluctant given their awareness of the US umbrella protection.
Finally an independent early warning system as foreseen for Europe (NATO/WEU) is still far away. Even if the need is defined (WEU), the development never materialized. Also the probability of having the US umbrella and the awareness that the US is willing to share this information with their alliances is taken into account.
Having defined the need for an independent ballistic missile defense the question raises if
Europe has the capability to develop their own systems and/or cooperate with existing and future developments in the USA or elsewhere.
European Industrial Capabilities
Europe has the capabilities to develop and produce their own ballistic missile defense Both programs however are delayed because of political and financial problems in France and Germany.
One of the major problems in Europe in 'armament' cooperation is the rising cost factor.
More members will make it more difficult than with only two to achieve the cost-effectiveness and efficiency sought from a bilateral framework 8 . This problem should be solved and solutions should be found in the direction of an 'offset' not necessarily related to the space program itself.
So it is obvious that Europe has the capability and technology to develop any ballistic missile defense system and space related supporting systems. The technology, development, and production capabilities are there, but on the political side, it is hard to bring all nations together
and to decide what to do and to fund such programs.
How could Europe improve their military budget constrains and in the same time build on an independent missile defense capability? Because of the political diversity among the several European countries the answer can not easy to be found. One thing is sure, money is an extremely important issue. If Europe could reorganize its military financial management, this might lead to the right answers.
Financial Management
Why is Europe far behind on their ballistic missile air defense ? Like with so many other issues, lower budgets are the main reason for not defining or slowing down existing developing programs. Next to space development we have the same situation in developing areas like weapons (land, sea and air related), in fact in all areas where profit is not the prime goal.
Governments of today are not willing anymore to provide unlimited funding for any program that their departments, industries or even science agencies are proposing. Industries who are not depending on government contracts are less vulnerable. There are only a few companies who can continue their developments without government support; those involved in communications are a good example.
All departments are facing a period where they have to do more with less money and there will be no change in the near future. This means that everyone has to be more flexible and creative in spending their money. This is the moment where we have to think how we still can fund developments and support at the same time the prime needs as foreseen by our governments.
A solution is the combination in the use of assets developed for military and all other departments, and the use of these assets for commercial purposes. Within existing satellites, The opponent will always argue that for security and availability reasons he needs a complete independent system to be developed according to his own requirements. However we should not forget that the 'civil' technology of today is already passing the 'military' technology and therefore it is better to link up with the civilian developing process. Commercial is not always cheaper and the intelligence community or tactical operators have special needs that preclude use of commercial systems. 'Commercial' is not working in all places around the world the DoD needs to go. International commercial organizations have clauses in their contracts which preclude Defense from using its assets in certain times or for certain uses.
Some (military) leaders deny the need of high resolutions because they are more interested in a big overview of a certain area than in a 'spot' view (however precision bombing needs accuracy data, thus high resolution data). Nevertheless it is sure that the military did use a lot of commercial images during the Gulf war and it is foreseen that in the future there will be an increasinge in the purchase of commercial images 10 . As Robert Davis, Defense Department Deputy Under Secretary for Space, said: 'Commercial systems, ... are likely to play roles in a military space strategy being assembled to guide spending during the next 20 years' 11 . Already today commercial imagery can do 80 percent of the jobs tasked to the spy satellites. Photos from spy satellites cost about 10,000 times more per picture than commercial satellites 12 .
As is normal, the truth is somewhere in between. As an answer to budget cuts however, the opponent has to think about cooperation and might even be forced to open his doors for commercial interests. Already today there is a significant civilian part that supports the military needs. In the future this part will even grow.
Next to a better use of civil assets and support by civil agencies for military needs, the best way to have a financial acceptable independent ballistic missile defense capability is looking for international cooperation. Special for those systems which cannot be developed in Europe on short notice or for those systems which are already available elsewhere in the world. International cooperation will reduce the costs by using existing limited resources efficiently (EuropeanEuropean with US -European with Russia). But how can international cooperation with technology sharing and spin-off for European industries be realized?
International Cooperation
International cooperation and common developments of weapon systems (F16, TORNADO, PATRIOT, ROLAND and STINGER) are well known in NATO. These cooperations are
European based only or transatlantic. But has there been a real technology share and an offset?
Yes all these programs were based on sharing technology and/or offset, so it has been proven that it can work.
According to the NATO's Industrial Working group there are a couple of current and future cooperation projects based on European and US industrial capabilities. The two current TMD projects (ground based systems) to improve early warning and surveillance capabilities in the context are:
The Existing improved Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) have been optimized for the detection of long-range strategic missiles, but the fundamental qualities of these radar's can provide useful early warning capability against shorter range TBMs. Also, these systems have not been fully integrated into the air defense structure of NATO. 13 It has, therefore, been proposed in US/NATO working groups that radar's, such as BMEWS, should be considered as a potential TMD early warning system. In order to do this, a better understanding of their capability with respect to TMD and associated TMD tracking algorithms is required. A joint UK/US program will examine the application of advanced tracking algorithms and schemes to the BMEWS data.
Another joint program is the Early Warning (EW) Sensor Integration (UK/US/NATO-STC).
Ballistic missile early warning and cueing is an essential part of any integrated TMD system. Having described the basics about theater missile defense as a complex system in chapter 2 , it is obvious that the development of a whole TMD architecture from spaced based sensors to two tier capable interceptors will take a long time and will be very expensive. Single European nations can not afford this.
Future Fields of Cooperation -Global Cooperation
Should Europe in the future look for international cooperation? The answer is yes. The
European Space Agency (ESA) both military and commercial is going through some difficult years. Agreement on several programs was very difficult and is still a major problem. ESA is facing an (internal) organizational problem 16 former Soviet Union, some European countries, and part of the eastern world were duplicating their development of weapon systems for entering and exploiting space. Today no country and almost no industry are able to continue the duplication. An answer should be found to avoid these duplications. Spreading research and development, prototyping, production and support of space assets (including subsystems and assembly) over the world's nations would be the most simple solution. This is maybe wishful thinking today, but necessary tomorrow.
A formula has to be developed where on a competitive base all the nations of the world can participate in future space programs. A major condition will be that all participating nations will contribute in R&D, production and support in these programs on an equal share; future benefits will be also shared on an equal base. Based on a share per head per country, calculations can be made and shows that the costs for France and Germany are significantly reduced (more than 40%) and the program could continue. 21 One step to further the ability to develop a theater missile defense system by and for Europe against acceptable costs encompasses an approach where all European nations would equally share the costs as a percentage of their GNP as shown before. For those systems already on the market or in development (such as MEADS, THAADS, Early Bird), cooperation should be found with the US where equal share of work (offset) is again guaranteed. Important for the European countries is to keep in touch in quality and productability. The result would be a (mobile) missile defense system which can be used as a defense for Europe and as a missile defense for all those European forces deployed around the world fulfilling their WEU, NATO or UN missions.
Coming back to the question, does Europe needs its own theater missile defense capability, where the answer is yes, all nations should share the (financial) consequences.
Cynically if the world would be willing to develop a worldwide early warning and reconnaissance system, and a related missile defense architecture open for all nations in the world, there would be almost no chances for any major conflict in the world. A global early warning and reconnaissance architecture would be a perfect tool for the UN.
Notes
Conclusion
The danger of proliferation and wide spread of Ballistic Missiles, especially Tactical Ballistic
Missiles are recognized by the US and the European NATO partners. While the US are way ahead in developing and deploying a multi-tier defense architecture against Tactical Ballistic
Missiles, NATO and its European countries are at the beginning. Appropriate programs and actions are discussed to protect the Alliance against a TBM threat for homeland defense and deployed forces in out of area operations.
However in the field of ground based interceptors the Europeans have some capabilities with their PATRIOT systems. To fulfill all necessary functions in a TBMD architecture NATO still relays on US assets, especially on space based assets. The importance of space based assets, owned and operated by the US is well recognized. Information from space based systems for early warning, detection and tracking of TBM are available for the European partners.
But there are no international cooperation's to develop and deploy sensitive early warning and detection assets for TBMD purposes. International cooperation in defense matters however has been successful in the past and will be in the future. Several cooperation programs -except in space technology-are initialized in NATO to develop an effective TBMD system. The European civilian industries had proven their capabilities to develop satellite systems and have the technology expertise and capacities to do that. To develop an European independent political and defense identity in the WEU, especially for operations without or very limited US participation, it is necessary to operate own and independent space assets for reconnaissance, intelligence, early warning and surveillance. Helios and Horus are the first steps to develop such a kind of independence. These European cooperation programs can be later trade in for a global use of space assets and a technology share across the Atlantic.
International cooperation on an equal and fair basis -even in the sensitive area of space issues -are a way to use efficient limited resources and to reduce cost as well, especially in times of budget restrains. Furthermore it is a signal for common goals and political willingness to deter a worldwide TBM threat and the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means.
TBMD and international cooperation in all aspects of Defense are furthermore effective counterproliferation means and will enable the free world to establish a solid Tactical Ballistic
Missile Defense not only for Europe. This can even be a realistic and possible way to build a Global Missile Defense for the future.
